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In popular culture, evolution is often understood as something 
like an agent: ‘mother nature’ is described as ‘choosing’ the 
best traits and ‘discarding’ the worst. The behaviour of other 
animals is likewise often described in terms of their interests, 
strategies, and goals. Emperor penguins (Aptenodytes 
forsteri) are described as huddling in order to stay collectively 
warm. The European honeybee (Apis mellifera) uses a 
waggle dance because it wants to communicate information 
to others in the hive. And the behaviour of chimpanzees 
(Pan troglodytes) is compared to human strategizing over 
mates, resources, and their position in social hierarchies and 
networks. One need go no further than a David Attenborough 
documentary to see the abundance of this intentional 
language in our folk understanding of biology. In 2018, 
Samir Okasha finally released his long-awaited book Agents 
and Goals in Evolution [henceforth Agents and Goals] with 
Oxford University Press – a book aimed at addressing the 
status of these puzzling, yet strangely successful, intentional 
idioms.
Many non-biologists may be surprised to find that 
evolutionary biologists frequently engage in this talk of 
reasons, strategies, goals and wants at levels where we 
would usually deny the existence of a mind, such as groups 
or genes. Indeed, evolutionary biologists readily admit 
that scientists – including many of their colleagues within 
the biological sciences – find their tendency to use such 
agential language ‘unnerving, if not downright embarrassing’ 
(Ågren 2020, p. 266). It is seen as dangerous and unhelpful 
anthropomorphism to describe not only animals but also 
cells, (selfish) genes and even groups as having goals and 
intentions – the very opposite of a useful metaphor. And yet, 
evolutionary biologists persist in and even actively encourage 
the use of this language. Is there a scientific rationale to 
justify the use of what Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009) once 
aptly described as agential thinking, or is it merely a way of 
thinking particularly addictive to the human mind, expressing 
itself as something Richard Francis (2004) called Darwinian 
paranoia?
With admirable precision, clarity and knowledge, Okasha 
masters a subject-matter balancing act between evolutionary 
biology, economics and philosophy that carefully addresses 
a set of puzzling questions at the intersection of these fields: 
What does it mean to treat an organism as a ‘rational’ ‘agent’ 
with ‘goals’ and ‘interests’? In economics, this appears to 
make sense, but is there more to it in the biological world 
than mere metaphor (which is not to say that metaphors 
can’t be useful; see Veit and Ney 2021)? Furthermore, how 
do these assumptions play out as empirical hypotheses in 
the apparently adaptationist framework of those who use 
agential thinking? How does evolutionary optimization 
relate to optimization in rational choice models? Can fitness 
maximisation simply be mapped onto the utility maximisation 
framework of economics?
Okasha’s ambitious monograph wrestles with these 
questions, offering an incredibly rich and condensed work 
on a set of interdisciplinary questions neither philosophers 
of economics nor philosophers of biology have previously 
given much attention to. Indeed, Okasha underplays the 
role of economics within his book, a choice that appears 
to be motivated by a reluctance, stemming from a British 
sense of humility, to overstate his expertise in economics. 
The book contains three somewhat independent parts. In 
Part I, Okasha discusses the concept of agency and the 
possible justifications for using agential thinking. Part II 
focuses on the connection between agential thinking and the 
adaptationist program that has placed the greatest reliance 
on this mode of thinking. Finally, Part III addresses the 
links between rationality and evolution, fitness and utility, 
and agency in economics and biology. Time and time again, 
Okasha puts great care into supporting his arguments and 
not overstating his conclusions, concluding his monograph 
with characteristic modesty: ‘I hope that there is an element 
of truth in what I have written, and that the journey has been 
enjoyable for the reader’ (p. 233). But while this humility 
is commendable, it is also unfortunate since many of the 
philosophers of economics I know either have not heard 
of the book or do not consider it relevant to their field. Yet 
Okasha’s monograph contains contributions to the literature 
on irrational risk preferences, payoff discounting and 
intransitive choices that would easily find a home in the best 
journals the philosophy of economics has to offer. Indeed, 
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Okasha (2012, 2016) previously published two papers in the 
journal Economics & Philosophy urging the combination of 
insights from biology and economics. This would have made 
that journal another ideal target for a review of Okasha’s book, 
but they unfortunately – though not unexpectedly – declined 
to have the book reviewed for the very same reason it would 
have been valuable there: that it would not be sufficiently 
central to their readers’ interests.
Here, I hope that this review essay can at least partially remedy 
this lack of interest among philosophers of economics in the 
sort of interdisciplinary work produced by the likes of Samir 
Okasha, Cedric Paternotte, Alex Rosenberg, Don Ross, Armin 
Schulz, David Spurrett, Joeri Witteveen, Jack Vromen, myself 
and a long list of philosophers using evolutionary models 
such as Rainer Hegselmann, Cailin O’Connor, Hannah Rubin, 
Brian Skyrms and Kevin Zollman. A conceptual integration 
of the biological and social sciences, after all, has long been 
one of the goals of our fields, even if some have maintained 
that this would not be a very fruitful endeavour (Gintis 2006; 
Mesoudi 2007; Ross 2007; Hagen et al. 2008; Khalil 2010; 
Callebaut 2011; Earnshaw 2011; Gayon 2011; Hodgson and 
Knudsen 2011; Heintz et al. 2011; Nelson 2011; Witt 2011). 
Instead of providing a detailed analysis of Okasha’s new 
book, which may be impossible due to its breadth and has 
been partially attempted elsewhere (see discussion below), I 
will take a higher-level perspective in which I aim to cultivate 
interest among philosophers of economics in the themes 
Okasha is addressing and to locate the role of his new book 
in the larger philosophy of nature project that attempts to 
naturalise the notions of agency and rationality. 
Why is it that the tools of economics often allow us to explain 
and predict the behaviour and choices of non-human animals 
more adequately than those of the human targets for which 
they were originally designed? Bacteria, which have often 
successfully been described using the tools of evolutionary 
game theory (see Frey and Reichenbach 2011 for an overview), 
can hardly be described as mentally engaging in utility 
maximisation. The British economist and game theorist Ken 
Binmore – a close collaborator of Okasha’s – noted as much:
Maynard Smith’s book Evolution and the Theory of 
Games directed game theorists’ attention away from their 
increasingly elaborate definitions of rationality. After all, 
insects can hardly be said to think at all, and so rationality 
cannot be so crucial if game theory somehow manages to 
predict their behaviour under appropriate conditions.
– Ken Binmore, foreword in Weibull (1995, p. x)
The question why such agential models are so successful 
within both biology and economics is puzzling, since humans 
similarly cannot be said to satisfy the increasingly elaborate 
definitions of rationality common in rational choice theory. 
But neither economics nor the philosophy of economics 
appears to have shown much interest in investigating these 
interdisciplinary questions in detail (see Ross 2005 for an 
exception). 
This is partially surprising since the first contemporary 
philosopher of economics, Alex Rosenberg (1976), was quite 
interested in this question and, unlike his contemporaries 
Dan Hausman (1992) and Uskali Mäki (1992), defended 
a highly critical view of the status of economics and its 
idealised rationality assumptions, urging the field to move 
closer to actual empirical work in psychology, biology and 
neuroscience. Upon realising that ‘economists were not going 
to take much notice of the work done in the philosophy of 
economics’, Rosenberg left the philosophy of economics 
in the 1980s after 15 years of work in the field in order ‘to 
work in the philosophy of biology, a subdiscipline in which 
the cognate scientists have shown more sympathy, interest, 
and willingness to be influenced by philosophers’ (Rosenberg 
2009, p. 59). Indeed, without Rosenberg’s decision to change 
fields, this review essay might not have existed. As Okasha 
himself admits: ‘I am also indebted [...] to Alex Rosenberg 
whose lectures [as a visiting professor at Oxford] initially 
aroused my interest in philosophy of biology’ (Okasha 2006, 
p. v).
While Rosenberg’s highly critical stance on economics didn’t 
gain him many followers in the subsequent development 
of the philosophy of economics as an independent branch 
of the philosophy of science, his work underwent a steep 
increase in attention as a result of the global financial crisis. 
Re-evaluating his earlier work in the light of his work in 
the philosophy of biology, Rosenberg (2009) went so far 
as to argue that economics itself should be seen as a sub-
discipline of biology: ‘[a]lmost everything mysterious and 
problematical to the empiricist philosopher of science about 
economics is resolved once we understand economics as a 
biological science’ (p. 59). 
The philosophy of science of decades past was often a highly 
abstract and general debate regarding science as a whole. 
This body of work, with the exception of early pioneers such 
as Popper, has largely been ignored by scientists. With the 
growth of the field, however, we have seen the development 
of the philosophies of various special sciences as sub-fields 
in their own right. But while the philosophers of biology – or 
economics for that matter – responsible for that development 
have been concerned with the actual work of these sciences, 
there has often been a gap between the way philosophers and 
more theoretically inclined scientists have talked about the 
philosophical issues of their fields, a gap that only widened as 
these sub-fields grew and became more established in their 
own right. Okasha seemed motivated by similar concerns 
in his Evolution and the Levels of Selection, for which he 
received the Lakatos Award in 2009 – the most prestigious 
reward our field has to offer. He argued that the growing 
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gap between theoreticians and philosophers of science is 
one that should be closed, seeing this as the central task of 
his book. He argued that ‘[w]ith a few notable exceptions, 
philosophers’ discussions of the levels of selection have not 
used the language, concepts, and formal techniques used 
by the biologists themselves’ and that this explains why 
‘most philosophical discussions have not had much impact 
in biology’ (2006, p. 1). To achieve this goal of bridging the 
fields of theoretical biology and the philosophy of biology, 
Okasha was willing to become an expert in the mathematical 
tools and formalisms as well as the conceptual debates of 
evolutionary biologists. Indeed, he explicitly argued that 
his book targeted ‘evolutionary biologists, philosophers of 
science, and interested parties from other disciplines’ (p. 2). 
Evolutionary biologists responded kindly to his extreme 
caution, mathematical rigour and clear conceptual analysis 
of the levels-of-selection controversy, promptly making this 
work one of the most cited in the philosophy of biology. As 
Massimo Pigliucci (2007) rightly predicted in his review of 
Evolution and the Levels of Selection, the book could not be 
‘ignored by anyone interested in this field for many years to 
come’ (p. 551).
Agents and Goals can be seen simply as a continuation of 
Okasha’s work on the conceptual and theoretical foundations 
of evolutionary theory. It embodies all the characteristics 
that made Evolution and the Levels of Selection such an 
important book. It has the same or perhaps even more of 
the mathematical rigour that inspired the next generation of 
philosophers of biology such as Jonathan Birch (2013, 2017) 
and Pierrick Bourrat (2014, forthcoming) to become experts 
in the mathematical formalisms of practising biologists. 
A lucid philosophical analysis of the contrast between the 
agency of evolutionary biology and the agency of economic 
agents, it is written with such conceptual clarity and elegance 
that it can be understood by economists, philosophers and 
biologists alike. Most strikingly, perhaps, it is beautifully 
characteristic of the detailed knowledge and care that have 
come to be associated with Okasha’s style of philosophy. 
The book is largely a result of a European Research Council 
grant that Okasha received from 2013–2017 as a Principal 
Investigator for his ‘Darwinism and the Theory of Rational 
Choice’ project and of his earlier 2008–2011 grant from 
the Arts and Humanities Research Council for a project on 
‘Evolution, Cooperation and Rationality’, which culminated 
in an influential edited volume with Ken Binmore titled 
Evolution and Rationality (Okasha and Binmore 2012). 
Agents and Goals is simply the final synthesis of over 10 
years of philosophical engagement with theoretical work in 
both evolutionary biology and rational choice theory.
It is thus not surprising that since its release, the book has 
amassed a staggering number of reviews by an illustrious list 
of philosophers and evolutionary biologists. In their editorial 
of an issue centred around a review symposium of Agents 
and Goals in the Review journal Metascience, Boschiero and 
Wray (2019) praise Okasha’s book as a seminal contribution 
to both evolutionary biology and philosophy. The issue 
features reviews by Daniel C. Dennett (2019), evolutionary 
biologist Andy Gardner (2019) and philosopher/evolutionary 
game theorist Hannah Rubin (2019), alongside a reply to all 
three by Okasha (2019). Additional reviews of Okasha’s book 
have been provided by a long list of philosophers of biology 
such as Jonathan Birch (2019) in Mind, Robert A. Wilson 
(2019) in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Philippe 
Huneman (2020) in Acta Biotheoretica, Cailin O’Connor 
(2020) in Philosophy of Science and Adrian Stencel (2020) in 
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences. Finally, we find 
an elegant review by evolutionary biologist J. Arvid Ågren 
(2020) in The Quarterly Review of Biology. I have met, or at 
least been in contact with, all but one of these commentators, 
which is indicative on the one hand of the interest in Okasha’s 
book but on the other hand of how unfortunately narrow the 
field of researchers is who are interested in the connection 
between evolution and rational choice theory.
In this regard, it should be clear why Agents and Goals will 
unfortunately not reach the same status as Evolution and 
the Levels of Selection. Unlike the hard-fought debates over 
Darwinian individuality, units of selection, kin selection, and 
group selection, all of which notably spiked shortly after the 
publication of Okasha’s book on the levels of selection, there 
simply isn’t a parallel conflict regarding the use of agential 
language in evolutionary biology. This is not to say that it is 
not a good book. In many ways, it embodies all the virtues 
of Okasha’s previous monograph; indeed, in my opinion it 
surpasses its predecessor. Okasha had the difficult task of 
living up to the high expectations of the readers of his previous 
book and in many ways has succeeded in this endeavour. 
But quality is not the same as impact. Agential thinking 
is simply not seen as a controversial topic among many of 
the evolutionary biologists Okasha would like to address, 
as is emphasized in Gardner’s highly critical and somewhat 
uncharitable review. Nevertheless, I consider Agents and 
Goals a striking example of the importance of philosophy of 
science for addressing questions practising scientists do not 
have the time to engage themselves. This is not to say there is 
no conflict or that there are no differences in opinion on the 
status of this language, but rather that it is a comparatively 
minor debate that many practising evolutionary biologists 
simply ignore (see Tarnita 2017; Veit 2019a). Okasha’s goal 
in Agents and Goals, of course, is to argue that this is not the 
right stance to take and that evolutionary biologists should be 
more careful in how they use this language. But this isn’t quite 
the same contribution as Okasha’s previous monograph. In 
one case there is a longstanding and theoretically challenging 
issue that biologists have wrestled with for decades. There, 
Okasha’s work was a welcome contribution since it was 
largely able to provide conceptual clarity in a previously 
conceptually muddled debate. In the other, however, Okasha 
.
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will inevitably appear to practising scientists as someone 
who, despite their good intentions, interrupts their work to 
tell them that they should be more careful how to use their 
concepts – an activity philosophers of biology have long 
been engaged in with only marginal success. So, I am highly 
sceptical of Dennett’s prediction that Okasha’s book ‘might 
well become the consensus classic text for biologists to fall 
back on when they find themselves unable to resist both 
function talk and agent talk in the course of their inquiries 
and explanations’ (2019, p. 355) or that it will turn out like 
Pigliucci’s assessment of his earlier book. Dennett’s view 
seems more motivated by his strongly adaptationist stance, 
treating natural selection as a universal acid (Dennett 1995), 
and obviously by the power of his intentional stance, which 
we’ve jointly applied elsewhere (Veit et al. 2019). Thanks to 
Okasha, however, I now fear that these intentional stances 
may sometimes mislead us when thinking about evolution.
Unlike the concepts of individuality, replicators, units and 
levels of selection, which are highly contested in evolutionary 
biology as concepts intended to capture scientific phenomena, 
agential talk is used merely as a heuristic to better understand 
biological phenomena. The goal of biologists is decidedly not 
to argue that these biological entities should necessarily be 
understood as agents, but that it is a useful (perhaps even 
necessary) way to make progress in our understanding of 
evolution. This is what Gardner (2019) apparently wants to 
express in his somewhat backhanded reply to Okasha that 
‘in science it is the usefulness of a concept, rather than its 
philosophical tidiness, that provides its ultimate justification’ 
(p. 359). This, of course, is a widely accepted point among 
philosophers of science – and Okasha is no exception. What 
matters is how useful this way of thinking is in scientific 
practice. That particular models, frameworks or concepts 
are used among scientists is, of course, no proof that they 
are necessarily useful, and philosophers of science may 
sometimes need to take a stance that does not simply embrace 
model anarchism in a sort of anything-goes mentality – 
though I often think that philosophers err on the wrong side 
here and should indeed be more pluralist (Veit 2019b, 2020; 
Veit & Browning 2020). 
For a long lineage of British theoretical biologists such as 
Dawkins, Gardner, Alan Grafen or Maynard Smith, whose 
‘neo-Paleyan’ methodology and academic training is the 
application of adaptationist thinking, there will naturally 
be little question that agential thinking must be useful (see 
Gardner 2017; Lewens 2019). Gardner (2019), for instance, 
appeals to Fisher’s (1930) fundamental theorem of natural 
selection as something like a lawlike proof that ‘reveals the 
identity of the adaptive agent, the individual organism, and 
pinpoints her agenda, maximization of her fitness’ (p. 361). 
To which Okasha (2019) elegantly retorts that Gardner is 
‘guilty of reading his own [‘]agenda[’] into Fisher’ (p. 378). 
Indeed, Gardner merely shows that agential thinking is built 
into the practice of many evolutionary biologists. Hiding 
behind his characterisation of Okasha as a ‘philosopher’ by 
suggesting the ‘empirical to be outwith his purview’, whereas 
his own justification is, quote, ‘scientific’ in nature (p. 362), 
obscures the fact that it is Gardner – not Okasha – who relies 
on a priori arguments for the legitimacy of agential thinking. 
Okasha’s book shows that it is right to question whether 
this mode of thinking is necessary and helpful or merely 
unquestioned dogma.
In his quest to address this problem, Okasha distinguishes 
between two different kinds of agential thinking. Type 1 
treats organisms as goal-directed agents – rational agents 
designed to maximise their own fitness. Type 2 treats the 
process of natural selection as itself an agent. I agree with 
Okasha’s careful conclusion that agential thinking of type 
2 is probably more harmful than useful, rightly criticising 
Darwin, who likewise felt unease about his talk of nature as 
something like an agent. It is not a necessary ingredient for 
making sense of evolutionary phenomena, even if helpful as 
a heuristic learning tool. Too often has it led to misleading 
views of natural selection as itself being a goal-directed 
process (though see Rubin (2019) for a defence of type-2 
thinking). Type-1 thinking, on the other hand, can often be 
useful, which raises the question of why this is so. What makes 
agential thinking of this type so successful in understanding 
evolution? Discussing a variety of philosophical options, 
Okasha draws on discussions of intentional-state attributions 
to other humans to argue that it is unity of purpose that 
makes agential explanations successful: ‘the organism’s traits 
must have evolved because of their contribution to a single 
overall goal, so have complementary rather than antagonistic 
functions. To the extent that this is not so, it ceases to be 
possible to think of the organism as agent-like’ (p. 230).
Both Gardner (2019) and Stencel (2020) argue that the book 
would benefit from more of a discussion of the connection 
between agential thinking and evolutionary disputes over the 
levels of selection and the location of Darwinian individuals 
as well as a discussion of more biological examples. But 
Agents and Goals is already an incredibly rich book. One 
immediately notices that Okasha tried to fit as much novel 
content into his book as possible, leaving much of the 
content from his previous papers on the connection between 
rationality and evolution in footnotes, rather than merely 
presenting us with a collection of papers. This can only be 
recommended – doubly so because it appears to have become 
increasingly rare for scholars of Okasha’s reputation. So, I 
would encourage readers of his book to seek out additional 
papers Okasha has written rather than treat the book as a 
mere summary of his work (see for instance Okasha 2013; 
Okasha & Paternotte 2014).
I fear, however, that Okasha’s analysis may have given an 
impression of the sorts of purely conceptual investigations 
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that are now often criticised among philosophers of science: 
too much focus given to the internal coherence of a concept 
rather than to how it is used in practice. Indeed, Okasha’s 
philosophy is of a peculiar sort because it embraces the 
style of an older tradition. In his Evolution and the Levels 
of Selection, for instance, Okasha describes himself as a 
‘conservative’ treating clarification of scientific concepts as 
the core of his understanding of the purpose of philosophy 
of science, thus assuming ‘a fairly sharp distinction between 
empirical and conceptual questions, an unfashionable view 
in some quarters’ (2006, p. 2). Despite this, Okasha’s work 
is celebrated across our discipline (as well as in evolutionary 
biology) as some of the best work the philosophy of biology 
has to offer. And for good reason. Firstly, Okasha has achieved 
mastery of the tools of conceptual analysis, single-handedly 
proving that this more traditional style of doing philosophy 
of science still has a useful role to play if done well. Secondly, 
Okasha has developed an intricate knowledge of both the 
philosophical and the scientific literature despite the fact 
that each has grown exponentially (and the two have grown 
exponentially apart). Okasha, in a way, writes for those who 
are already familiar with the empirical work of the sciences 
and is extremely cautious not to misrepresent their work. I 
thus think that Gardner’s and Stencel’s respective criticisms 
are both largely misplaced. Okasha’s suggestion to focus on 
the unity of purpose is obviously influenced by his earlier 
work on the levels of selection. To have a conflict of interest 
between a gene and the organism is both a conflict between 
two levels of selection and a conflict between two levels of 
agency. Okasha offers a causal account that attributes agency 
as something that comes in degrees and explains why agential 
thinking is successful by capturing the shared evolutionary 
fate of multicellular arrangements. Once we explicate these 
implicitly empirical premises of Okasha’s account by linking 
it to work in experimental evolutionary biology, we can turn 
his suggestion ‘that once we have identified the relevant 
level of selection/adaptation in any particular case, this will 
immediately yield the right candidate for the role of agent, if 
we wish to apply agential thinking’ (p. 43) into an argument 
supported by empirical work. When agency is explicitly built 
into theoretical models, it seems hard to deny that this could 
be harmful rather than a mere idealisation. But just as in 
economics, it is an open question whether and where the kind 
of optimising agency can be found in nature that would make 
agential thinking useful for understanding actual biological 
target systems. The application of models to this empirical 
work is a different matter altogether, appearing to function as 
a form of ‘plumbing’ (Veit 2021). Indeed, often it is only after 
doing an enormous amount of empirical work that we have 
understood how selection has shaped ‘super-organisms’, 
such as beehives, that make it useful to think of the group 
as an agent (see also Tarnita 2017). The empirical work 
comes first – the agential description only later, once we’ve 
understood the units of selection. This is why Tarnita (2017) 
urges empirical research largely to omit loaded language in 
order to approach these target systems with a certain sense 
of theoretical neutrality. Once we have understood them, 
however, it may be useful to treat them in agential terms. 
The justification for agential thinking, as Okasha points out, 
should thus ultimately be empirical, not a priori.
This brief overview has left out many of the details and 
much of the nuance in Okasha’s discussion, but it offers an 
insight into the main arguments Okasha makes in Part I on 
agency in evolutionary biology and Part II on agency and 
fitness-maximisation. The third and final part of Agents 
and Goals finally addresses the topic I was most interested 
in: the connection between the maximisation models of 
economics and those of evolutionary biology. In many ways, 
this is where I see the greatest potential for philosophical 
contributions: drawing connections between different 
fields, bringing empirical evidence together and building a 
single connected picture of the world. Godfrey-Smith (2013) 
emphasizes the importance of this work in philosophy with 
a comment attributed to Richard Rorty, who noted that 
philosophy is in a unique position as the only ‘place in the 
university where a student can bring any two books from the 
library and ask what, if anything, they have to do with each 
other’ (p. 4). But conceptual analysis alone can get us only 
so far in achieving this goal. This is unfortunate because the 
discussion starts out strong, examining the hypothesis that 
adaptive behavioural plasticity could be a precursor to proto-
rationality in non-human animals. However, it then quickly 
dives into a discussion of various concepts of rationality. 
While Okasha’s discussion usefully distinguishes between 
rationality as an evolutionary product and rationality as a 
concept, model or heuristic tool for thinking about evolution, 
relatively little time is spent on how these concepts would 
help us explain the evolution of agency – how they would 
enable us to understand the messy and complex nature of 
agency in nature.
Here, we find a rich and still developing interdisciplinary 
literature without any stable concepts or consensus. This is 
not the same kind of conflict that would benefit from the sort 
of conceptual analysis that made Evolution and the Levels of 
Selection so successful. Economists justifying their models by 
recourse to evolutionary biology, and evolutionary biologists 
doing the same through recourse to rational choice models, 
simply do not care very much about whether their models and 
modes of explanations fit perfectly. It is thus not surprising 
that Okasha provides us with an elegant demonstration in 
Chapter 7 of the many ways these two forms of rationality 
can come apart. Indeed, Okasha’s discussion of behavioural 
ecology and ecological rationality nicely demonstrates that 
neither evolutionary biologists nor economists can ignore the 
mechanisms – both evolutionary and cognitive – that make 
agential explanations work in practice. Merely asserting a link 
to a different discipline in which the same mode of thinking is 
used can no longer be considered enough to justify the use of 
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agential thinking. This I see as the greatest accomplishment 
of Agents and Goals. Okasha has made astounding progress 
on many of the questions that have puzzled me since my 
days as an undergraduate in philosophy and economics but 
were relegated to niche discussions. The thorough treatment 
Okasha offers of the close connections and differences 
between the two utility-maximising paradigms offers the best 
discussion of this topic – so far – in the extant literature. And 
I hope that others in the philosophy of economics will become 
interested in engaging with the exciting interdisciplinary 
problems Okasha has exposed. 
After so much praise, I shall conclude my essay review with a 
more critical point of view that targets Okasha’s very style of 
doing philosophy. By exploring the concepts of fitness, utility 
and rationality in such depth, he leaves little space for talking 
about the evolution of rationality. Indeed, despite providing 
us once again with an A-game in what traditional philosophy 
has to offer, Okasha’s work also reflects the inevitable 
trade-offs inherent in this style of work. What is needed 
in this debate is an entirely different style of philosophy – 
represented in the work of Dennett, Godfrey-Smith, Ross, 
Spurrett, and Sterelny – that can hardly be described as the 
careful conceptual analysis found in Okasha and is often 
much closer to the sort of messy and speculative science 
found at the emergence of new research programs. What 
they are doing has been described as integrative philosophy 
of science, naturalist philosophy, synthetic philosophy or 
philosophy of nature. 
They are drawing together empirical results and theoretical 
models from a number of different sciences to explain the 
evolution of agency, even if their explanations are mere 
sketches to be worked out by future empirical research. 
This is clearly different from Okasha’s work, which has 
deliberately shied away from ‘speculating about empirical 
matters on which there isn’t much data yet’ [from personal 
conversation], which is not to say that Agents and Goals 
doesn’t make contributions to this more scientific project. 
In practice, there often isn’t a very sharp boundary between 
conceptual and empirical work providing multiple points of 
contact, even when one conceives their own work as purely 
conceptual. Okasha, for instance, draws on more speculative 
work by Godfrey-Smith (1996) and Sterelny (2003) for a 
possible explanation of the evolution of behavioural flexibility 
and rational decision-making as a response to environmental 
complexity. But in order to understand how actual decision-
makers evolve in nature, we will have to engage with a much 
more fluid, messy and gradualist conceptual framework that 
maps onto the soft, wet and complex reality of agency in 
nature. Having contributed to this literature myself (Veit & 
Spurrett 2021; Schlaile, Veit & Boudry forthcoming), I must 
say that this work will of necessity look very different from 
the contents of Agents and Goals. Indeed, Okasha’s current 
and my former institution – the University of Bristol – can 
perhaps even be considered the birthplace of this kind of 
work, with the likes of Ken Binmore, Alasdair Houston, 
Michael Mendl and John McNamara long challenging us 
to investigate the actual evolution of decision-making and 
agency.
But this should not be understood as a criticism of Okasha’s 
excellent book. Quite the opposite, in fact. In many ways, 
Okasha removes the conceptual stumbling blocks and 
confusions that have plagued those who sought to unite the 
insights of economics and biology. Still, more work is to be 
done. This is why Okasha’s urge to caution in the use of agential 
thinking, while perhaps not influencing evolutionary biology 
as a whole, will surely leave a mark on the interdisciplinary 
work of those trying to explain agency and rational decision-
making as an evolutionary product. When and why do 
agents evolve with preferences whose forms make economic 
explanations successful? To bridge this gap is to naturalise 
the sense in which Rosenberg described economics as a 
biological science. For those interested in engaging in this 
project, Okasha’s conceptually clear and careful book will 
provide the ideal entry point into and foundation for this vast 
and complex literature. Indeed, perhaps no one could have 
done this better than Okasha himself, a proof that this style of 
doing philosophy is not so ‘conservative’ after all.
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